INTRODUCTION
In October 1930, "impressed by the seriousness of the present situation, by the constant recurrence of such periods of economic depression and the failure up to the present to discover any concerted means for averting the losses incurred", the Eleventh Assembly of the League of Nations decided that the Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service "should undertake the study of the courses and phases of the present depression" (Ohlin 1931: 7-8 ; preface by Alexander Loveday, director of the Financial Section). Bertil Ohlin's report, which came out a year later, was the first product of that resolution. It consisted of an empirical investigation of the depression up to mid-1931, without much theoretical discussion (cf. Endres and Fleming 2002:30-35 ). Ohlin's study was based on country reports prepared by national Economic
Councils and Research Institutes, plus two meetings of their representatives held in Geneva in
March and July 1931 (Ohlin 1931: 8-11) . The minutes of the second conference (League of Nations Archive, Geneva) include a suggestion by Friedrich A. Hayek (then director of the Austrian Business Cycle Institute) to get a "distinguished economist to carry out a study of the recurrence of crises, a specialist who should not be burdened with any routine or administrative work, such as collecting data or obligations to publish forecasts". Ohlin supported Hayek's suggestion, stressing the difficulty of preparing an "authoritative report if, on every point, three or four different theories were advanced". Both argued that a synthetic view of economic fluctuations was necessary. Yet it was only three years later that the League would start a longterm program of business cycle research, under a five-year grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The grant was based on the decision to focus on economic stabilization as a program of concentration within social sciences, taken by 1933 by the trustees of the Foundation (cf. de Marchi 1991: 148-54) . The task faced by Haberler when he took up his appointment at the League of Nations was the development of a synthetic view of the business cycle on the basis of the seemingly conflicting theories that proliferated at the time. The importance of such a project is aptly made clear by Schumpeter' s remark that the debate on business cycles in the early 1930s gave the impression of being "nothing but disagreement and antagonism that went so far as to be discreditable to the science and even ludicrous " (1954: 1125) . The terms of the debate would change with the publication of Keynes's 1936 General Theory, which was written at the same time as the first drafts of Haberler's book. However, while Keynes reacted to the proliferation of business cycle theories by coming up with a new theory that shifted the focus on the determination of the short-run equilibrium level of employment and income, Haberler sought a consensus on which a generally accepted explanation of the cycle could be built.
Haberler 's Prosperity and Depression (1937) has been acclaimed as the authoritative survey of pre-Keynesian business cycle theories (see Schumpeter 1954 Schumpeter : 1123 Samuelson 1996 : 1682, and for further quotations Boianovsky 2000: 156) . With its five editions the book attained the status of a classic, and Haberler's synthesis of business cycle theories came 1 Haberler (b. 1900 Haberler (b. , d.1995 graduated from the University of Vienna in 1923, where he became extraordinary professor in the late 1920s. Craver (1986: 26) suggests that it was the publication of his path-breaking 1933 volume on trade theory which led to the appointment at the League of Nations in 1934. Yet Haberler's 1931 memorandum on "the purchasing power of gold", submitted to the League's Gold Delegation (German translation in Haberler 1932a) , may also have influenced that decision. (Haberler was not, however, the first choice; as pointed out by Moggridge (1995: 225 n.2), Loveday had offered the survey to Dennis Robertson, who declined). The first edition of Prosperity and Depression was published by the League in 1937. The second edition came out in 1939, with a new chapter 8 added to Part I. The third edition was published in 1943, enlarged by a Part III ("Further reflections on recent developments in trade cycle theory"). The fourth and fifth editions (both by private publishers) came out in 1958 and 1964 with changes in Part III and new appendices.
to coexist with the "Neoclassical Synthesis" in macroeconomics, whose origins date back to the same year, to John Hicks's "Mr Keynes and the Classics" (1937) . At present, macroeconomics seems to be converging on a "New Neoclassical Synthesis" that combines Real Business Cycle theory, New Keynesian ideas and Wicksellian concepts of cumulative processes and monetary policy (cf. Woodford 2003: 6-10) . It may therefore be instructive to take a look back at the genesis of Prosperity and Depression in the 1930s. This paper describes the process in which
Haberler attempted to create a consensus in business cycle theory, and we discuss in how far his attempt was successful in the light of the reactions of his fellow economists. Our investigation is based mainly on the correspondence that followed the circulation of the first draft of Part I of the report, on the verbatim records of the meetings of June/July 1936, and on a comparison between the successive drafts and the published version of Prosperity and Depression (henceforth PD).
II. REACTIONS TO HABERLER'S 1934 SURVEY
Haberler's 1934 memorandum on the theories of the business cycle (held at the League of Nations Archive) has six chapters: introduction; purely monetary theories; over-investment theories; under-consumption theories; "horizontal maladjustments" and rise of costs as causes of crisis and depression; agriculture and the business cycle. The chapter on over-investment theories, which comprises almost half of the fifty-page survey, is divided into five sections on monetary and non-monetary theories (respectively), on over-investment resulting from changes in the demand for consumers' goods, on the principle of the acceleration of derived demand, and on the course of the depression. Haberler's (1934: 2; cf. 1937a: 6-7) starting point is that a complex phenomenon such as the business cycle is caused by many factors, so that there is room for a variety of explanations which are "not mutually exclusive and contradictory". The survey is "intended to show how different theories may contribute something towards an understanding of the business cycle", and that "we have to study different theories not in order to reject all but one... but in order to retain certain parts of some of them and combine them with others into a coherent whole". 1937a: iv) . 3 However, Haberler's main objective in circulating the memorandum was not to assure the accuracy of his survey, but to get reactions to his interpretation from economists in general. In the covering letter Haberler pointed out that the memorandum should be considered as "tentative", and that he intended, "in the light of comments received, to work it out in greater detail and, in particular, with the help of statistical and other factual analysis, to make a contribution to the solution of the controversial questions raised".
Reactions from Cambridge
Keynes (30 August 1934) reacted negatively to the project, writing Haberler that "I cannot think that you have gone the right way to work. The method of taking various propositions in isolation is to bring authors into the same pigeon-hole who are really leagues apart and have very little in common". Haberler (25 October 1934) replied that Keynes's reaction was an exception:
I appreciate the perfect frankness of your letter, although I am sorry that you are without sympathy for my paper. In the light, however, of the comments of a great number of very competent scholars... I wish to tell you quite frankly that I do not believe that my representation is so bad as you think... When I set out to show, by an impartial exposition of the various theories and after clearing away irrelevant terminological differences, that... the differences between many writers on the subject are not as great as is commonly assumed, I realized that this attempt at conciliation was not a grateful task... Nevertheless, the comments which I have received on my memorandum from many of the writers concerned express on the whole considerable sympathy with my attempt at reconciliation.
In his response Keynes (31 October 1934 ) rejected Haberler's strategy, indicating that he had adopted a completely different one in his own forthcoming "new book":
My essential point is that the method you have adopted forces you to a high degree of superficiality... I cannot believe that the solution can be reached by bringing together... excerpts from the views of a large number of writers, each differing from the other more or less in fundamentals. The answer must lie somewhere much deeper down, yet your method tempts you to skating rather than digging.
The "terminological differences" mentioned in Haberler's Robertson (1934) , whose framework would be adopted in Part II of PD. Furthermore, he emphasized, the explanation of unemployment by changes in investment is "shared by a great number of economists (Spiethoff, Hansen, Hayek, Cassel) . My memorandum is full of these theories". He did not, however, reply on that occasion to Kahn's claim (13 November 1934 ) that other economists are not able to establish a "simple relationship between the rate of investment and total output" as expressed by the multiplier formula in Kahn (1931 1934: 32) , pointing out that "forced saving" is precisely that counterpart. 5 Haberler deleted the passage in the published version of PD. Probably in reaction to another comment of Robertson, Haberler (1937a: 101) also eliminated his earlier observation (made in connection with a criticism of Mitchell) that the rise of money-wages lags behind the rise of prices even in the later phases of the boom (Haberler 1934: 43) . Furthermore, Robertson argued in critique of Haberler (1934: 35-37 ) that a "shortage of capital" and an "insufficiency of demand for consumers' goods" need not be mutually exclusive. Haberler (21 September 1934) was not quite convinced, but reproduced Robertson's argument in PD (1937a: 123-24) .
Reactions from Oxford and London
The lack of detailed discussion of Keynes's 1930 notion of a "natural rate of interest" and of
Keynes's analysis of the absence of forces to bring the market rate to its "natural" value was noticed by Harrod in letters of 19 October and 5 November 1934. Haberler (25 October) pointed out that "the difficulties I experience with [Keynes's] explanation of the trade cycle are connected with his theoretical groundwork (his 'fundamental equations')". In his first letter Harrod suggested that Haberler should remove passages indicating that non-monetary theories of the cycle imply a change in the "effective quantity of money" MV, since such remarks pertain rather to part II ("synthesis"). Haberler (1934: 33, 45-46; cf. 1937: 116, 151) removed the passages and discussed the matter in part II of PD (180). More substantially,
Harrod criticized Haberler for suggesting that the acceleration principle (an overproportional increase in the demand for fixed capital goods in reaction to a rise in demand for consumption goods) implies a lengthening of the average period of production (1934: 27 Haberler's (1934: 8) passing reference to Wicksell's and Fisher's respective theories of the relation between interest and prices should be elaborated with a clear distinction between the "natural rate" and the "real rate", which Haberler (1937a: 35) did.
Asked by Haberler (11 September 1934) (1934: 35) .
3.
Reactions from the Continent Tinbergen (16 November 1934) noticed the absence of any mathematical discussion in
Haberler's memorandum, supposing that Haberler had "not given much attention to an exact statement of all relations forming a given closed system", because he had to write "for mathematically unskilled readers". Tinbergen referred to his forthcoming Econometrica survey of quantitative business cycle theories (Tinbergen 1935) , which Haberler (1937a: 8) came to mention in connection with the distinction between "exogenous" and "endogenous" theories. 7 Concerning the general argument in Haberler's memorandum, Tinbergen stressed the need to specify the assumptions about the quantitative relations involved. He criticized Haberler's (1934: 35) assertion that underconsumption theory overlooks the fact that the "accumulation of capital might go on for a very long time, practically indefinitely without any equally rapid increase in the output of consumers' goods". According to Tinbergen, "of course the question is whether quantitative relations in reality fulfill this assumption or not". Haberler (1937a: 118, italics On that occasion, Tinbergen did not bring up the argument that a complete mathematical model of the business cycle would render the central theme of PD -the discussion of turning points -obsolete (cf.. Tinbergen 1940, and Haberler 1943: 479-80 (cf. 1937a: 30) and reacted positively to Åkerman's discussion of the upturn in the business cycle, acknowledging that "it is true that the theory of the revival... has not been satisfactorily discussed in my memorandum and I hope to fill this gap later" (cf. 1937a: 57-60) . Einaudi (28 January 1935) criticized that Haberler's discussion of some topics -such as underconsumption theory and the role of inventories in the working of the acceleration principle -was incomplete. This led to further elaboration of those themes in PD. Haberler (1937a: 118; cf. 1934: 34-35) added that, even if consumer demand is decreased, a fall in the rate of interest may stimulate the construction of new capital equipment, insofar as the latter helps to lower unit costs. He also observed that derived demand for stocks of goods fluctuates less regularly than derived demand for capital equipment (1937a: 90; cf. 1934: 25) . Furthermore, Haberler (1937a: 27-28 ) followed Einaudi's suggestion to move the definition of "horizontal" and "vertical" maladjustments from the end of the memorandum (1934: 40) to the beginning.
Reactions from America
Haberler's relatively brief discussion of Mitchell's contributions (1934: 42-44; cf. 1937a: 100-103) raised complaints by Mills (26 October 1934), who found it "rather inadequate".
Haberler replied that he could not refer everywhere in the text to authors with a more consensual view, like Mitchell. on the definitions given to them". The whole passage was removed from PD. Viner (28 January 1935) reacted positively to the memorandum, but criticized it for "not giving second (econometric) stage of the League's business cycle project. 9 Haberler's sparse treatment of Mitchell may also be explained by his view that the Great Depression had exposed the "failure of the atheoretical approach" of the Harvard Committee and "the Mitchell School" (Haberler 1933b: 92) and that he found Mitchell's explanations of the crisis generally "vague and unhelpful" (1934: 42 n.). adequate attention to the monetary aspects", that is, a study of the business cycle from the cash balance angle. This may have influenced Haberler's extensive discussion of the role of cyclical changes in real balances in part II of PD. Like Schultz, Viner did not accept
Haberler's assumption that investment can only be increased by lengthening the production period. In his reply, Haberler (26 April 1935) maintained that "investment means initiating longer roundabout ways and is by definition connected with a lengthening of the production period". Viner remained unconvinced. Haberler (1937a: 37, n .1) would refrain from "going more closely into the matter, since the theories... under discussion can be analysed without a final decision" on "the problem of the 'time-dimension' of capital".
Angell (19 October 1934) wrote that "you rather dismiss psychological theories" (cf.
Haberler 1934: 40). While accepting that such theories are not sufficient to explain the turning points, Angell claimed that they account for the generality of a given movement of rise or fall. Haberler (1937a: ch. 7) came to add a chapter on "psychological theories" (see below). Marget (6 October 1936) urged Haberler to bring the role of expectations more into the foreground when using the "natural rate of interest" concept, a point that was also made by Kaldor. In his reply to Marget, Haberler (23 October 1936) wrote that he was studying Myrdal's (1933) "extremely important contribution, which opens quite new vistas". Marget also commented on Wicksell's concept of a natural rate of interest, suggesting that, given the problems associated with this terminology, it should be replaced by the notion of an "equilibrium rate of interest". Haberler (1937a: 32) complied.
Lederer (26 May 1935) complained that Haberler (1934: 32-37) 
III. BROADER CHANGES IN HABERLER'S SURVEY
The manuscript of Part I ("analysis") of PD, a second draft of the 1934 survey, was largely completed by December 1935 (Haberler 1936a; 1937a: 2) . It was distributed in June 1936, together with Part II ("synthesis"), to a "committee of experts". The committee, however, was told to focus exclusively on Haberler's synthesis (1936b) . Earlier in that year Haberler (1936c) provided a summary of the revised version of the 1934 survey and a first sketch of the synthesis in an article for the Harvard Review of Economic Statistics. There, as in the introduction to PD (1937a: 12), Haberler argued that theories should be assessed according to their ability to explain each of the four phases of the cycle: the cumulative processes of expansion ("prosperity") and contraction ("depression"), and the upper and the lower turning-points ("crisis" and "revival").
The Vanishing Attraction of Austrian Business Cycle Theory
Haberler's examination of the literature had led him to the conclusion that there was a large measure of agreement about the nature of the cumulative processes, but not about the turningpoints (1936c; 1937a: 185, 226) . The description of the contraction as a cumulative process that carries the system away from equilibrium was not shared by an important group of economists.
"Many economists used to explain depression simply by the necessity of liquidating the maladjustments which were created during the preceding expansion and which led to the collapse of the boom. An adjustment in the structure of production naturally takes time; it involves the transfer of labor among industries, and, by reason of the rigidity of wages and the lack of mobility of labor, it leads to unemployment... [H]owever,… one cannot thus explain why the depression spreads almost to all parts of the economic system. The fact that production contracts everywhere and prices fall all around makes it necessary to assume that the collapse of the boom -by whatever cause it may have been brought about -engenders a process of deflation which, once started, is just as cumulative as the process of expansion." (Haberler 1936c: 2-3) This criticism was clearly aimed at Hayek (1931) . This is noteworthy because, a few years earlier, Haberler (1931 Haberler ( , 1932b 
Accentuating the Acceleration Principle, and Other Changes
In the final version of his survey Haberler (1937a: 80-98) paid special attention to the role of the acceleration principle. The discussion was more detailed than in the 1934 memorandum, probably elicited by comments received from Robertson, Kaldor and others. According to Haberler, the principle brings out the strong influence of fluctuations in the demand for consumers' goods on investment and the business cycle mechanism as a whole. Haberler (1934: 23; 1937a: 81) claimed that the acceleration principle and the over-investment theory are "in reality not alternative but complementary explanations". He also considered possible connections between the acceleration principle and under-consumption theories (1934: 35; 1937a: 119 ).
Haberler's critique of "crude" under-consumption theories, which explain the downturn by a sudden increase in saving and a corresponding fall in consumption, carried through from the 1934 memorandum to the final version. In PD (1937a: 119-29), however, he expanded his discussion of what he had earlier described as the "sound element" of under-consumption theories (1934: 35-36) . This was the proposition that the insufficiency of demand for consumers' goods is caused by a rapid rise in their supply when the new roundabout methods of production maturean idea he mainly ascribed to Aftalion, Clark and Schumpeter. Haberler (1937a: 119-21) referred to this proposition when contrasting the two main rival explanations of the upper turning-point: (i) the supply of capital becomes too small to complete the new roundabout methods of production, or (ii) consumers' demand is insufficient to sustain the increased productive capacity. In the memorandum Haberler (1934: 36-37) had held the opinion that the dispute could be settled by empirical studies, suggesting that the high rates of interest observed at the end of the prosperity period supported the capital-shortage hypothesis. That discussion is eliminated from the subsequent versions, which can be in part explained by Haberler's realization that the rise in the interest rate may be nominal only (due to an expected rise in prices), or that it may be due to an absorption of loanable funds into financial circulation: "There is no single unfailing statistical criterion" (Haberler 1936c: 6) . Instead, the "critical question" is: "How should the flow of money between saving and spending and between the various branches of spending be modified in order to restore equilibrium?" (Haberler 1937a: 124; cf. 1936a: 147; 1936c: 5) Haberler's final version of his survey (1936a: 123-26; 1937a: 107-09 ) included a section on Fisher's debt-deflation theory, which had not been discussed in the 1934 memorandum.
Haberler conceded that Fisher's debt factor may play a role as an intensifier of the depression, but doubted that it could be considered an independent cause of the upper turning-point. There is no indication that this new section was sent to Fisher for comments.
A more extensive addition was chapter 6 of PD, titled "psychological theories", which give some hint as to how these expectations are formed" (Haberler 1939: 252) . Expectationsespecially price expectations determined by past experience -did nevertheless play a role in
Haberler's synthetic explanation of cumulative processes, as discussed below. 
IV. THE MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS

First Session
In the opening session (p. 1), Loveday described the meeting as a "conversation", without any formal demands such as reports or resolutions. The central question was "why do depressions occur or recur?" A "programme of the discussions on the business cycle" had been circulated by
Haberler on 30 May with an agenda of the topics to be discussed in each session. The order of discussion followed very closely the table of contents of Haberler's (1936b) "Synthetic Exposition", which is the same as Part II of Haberler (1937a) except for chapter 11 (on "International Aspects of Business Cycles"), which was written after the meetings.
13 Hayek (15 February and 3 May 1936) regretted that he could not participate because Haberler had invited Robbins as representative of the LSE. 14 However, those records are apparently not held at the League of Nations Archive. The copy used in the present essay has been located in the Bertil Ohlin papers at the Swedish National Archives. 15 Haberler (1964: V; 1976: 10) wrongly recollected that the meetings took place in August or September, respectively.
Haberler started by asking the participants if they agreed with his claim (1936b: ch. 1; 1937a: ch. 8) that the depression may be caused by various factors, so that "a fairly general theory can be given of the way it develops cumulatively, not given much attention at first to the way in which it has been started" (p. 21). There was general agreement about Haberler's approach (including the division of the cycle into four phases), but Hansen disputed Haberler's definition of prosperity and depression in terms of employment and volume of production (Haberler, 1936b: 6). Hansen claimed that changes in profit are a better index of cyclical fluctuation, since output could change for causes other than the business cycle. In the end, after some debate about index number problems involved in the distinction between real income and output, most of the conferees (especially Ohlin) supported Haberler's suggested measurement of fluctuations. 
Second Session
The second session addressed the cumulative process of expansion. Haberler proposed to start the analysis of the cycle at the low point of the depression, and not at full employment, in order to bring out the "essential" feature of the expansion process, namely the "reciprocal stimulation of investment and consumption" (second session, p. 14). There was no criticism of that, except for
Ohlin's remark that Haberler's discussion of the monetary aspects of the expansion (1936b: ch.
2.B) did not go much beyond Wicksell's original theory of the cumulative process. 17 Ohlin suggested that a more detailed discussion of the saving-investment mechanism should be provided, including recent contributions by Robertson (1934) . According to Ohlin, this could show how a higher level of expenditure in public works brings about "unintentional savings" able to finance the public deficit (pp. 30-31). There was general agreement that "we must have period analysis in the way indicated by Mr. Robertson", but there were difficulties in making different "terminologies" compatible with each other. Haberler insisted on confining the concepts of investment and saving to effective flows of money, whereas Ohlin stressed the importance of including the effects of discrepancies between expectations and outcomes, which are best brought out under the (Wicksellian) assumption of "a perfectly elastic monetary system" (pp. 32-44).
16 According to Haberler (1976: 11) , Hansen "did not take a very Keynesian position in the discussions at the conference. For example, he stressed the ups and downs of profits as the essential characteristic of the business cycle, while Bertil Ohlin and I argued in favor of expansion and contraction in output and employment". 17 However, Wicksell (1898) based his theory on the full-employment assumption, and for Hayek (1931 and 1933) full-employment equilibrium was crucial as a starting-point, since he considered the cycle to be a deviation that was corrected by the crisis; see also Trautwein (1996) .
Morgenstern (p. 45) asked Haberler to explain how his curves of the demand and supply of credit are constructed and equilibrium is determined, considering that demand is a function of the profit rate, whereas the relevant supply side variable is the interest rate (cf. Haberler 1936b: 34-37). Haberler answered that he "meant it here as being the same -the price of the investible funds" (p. 49). Ohlin disputed Haberler's assumption that there is a rate of interest that will keep the price level stable (p. 64). However, instead of debating that point in detail, Haberler suggested that "we turn to the acceleration principle, because that goes to the heart of the problem for some members of this group". After getting positive reactions (from Tinbergen, Hansen and Clark) to the role attributed to that principle in the expansion process (cf. 1936b: 42-51), Haberler asked Robbins if he agreed, since "the theory which you have does not stress this factor". Robbins replied that "I find myself in substantial agreement with what you have said, but I should not have been in agreement had it not been developed in such close connection with the theory of mine".
Third Session
In the morning of 30 June the conferees discussed a new section titled "saving and the expansion process" that had been circulated on the first day of the conference (cf. Haberler 1937a: ch. 9.A, sect. 6). The original draft has not survived. As Haberler pointed out, "these pages are largely written by Mr. Fleming and I must give the credit to him" (third session, p. 21). 18 The main issue in the new section is the effect of an increase of the propensity to save on the expansion process.
Haberler argued that, if savings increase, "this will put a brake on the rapidity of the expansion, but it will have a favorable influence, making it possible and easier then to reach equilibrium somewhere" (p. 29; cf. Haberler 1937a: 214-18 Haberler next moved the discussion to the cumulative process of contraction. He started by reaffirming his view that the depression should be seen not as a process of readjustment towards equilibrium, but as a cumulative deflationary process that carries the system away from equilibrium. Morgenstern agreed, but pointed out that "if no point of the whole business cycle ever passes through the equilibrium point,… that limits equilibrium analysis of static theory very much... and throws overboard the usefulness which one has so far seen in... starting from static conditions, which have been often, as you say yourself in the first part, used by Hayek" (third session, pp. 48-49).
According to Haberler, the main feature of the deflationary process is the reduction of the velocity of circulation of money and the increase of hoarding, which he described as a "striving for liquidity" (p.63). Ohlin complained that "you say nothing at all about how savings go, how losses come, and I should appreciate it if you added a … paragraph on this" (p. 67). The discussion turned instead to Haberler's (1937a: 226-39) detailed "monetary analysis of the contraction process". Haberler called attention to his criticism of Keynes's (1930) notion that sales of old assets to cover losses is a factor which makes for the intensification of deflation (Haberler 1936b: 67-69; 1937a: 236-38 ). Ohlin and Robertson agreed with Haberler's objection that savings of a part of the public are compensated by dissaving on the part of entrepreneurs, but suggested that it should be stressed that the mechanism is deflationary to the extent that it prevents the rate of interest from falling (pp. 81-82). Another deflationary factor discussed at that session was "Sales of securities or other assets for fear of a fall in their price" (pp. 90-92; cf. Haberler 1936b: 69; 1937: 238) . This is reminiscent of Keynes's (1936) speculative demand for money, but Haberler argued that hoarding has a deflationary effect irrespective of whether transactions actually take place (caused by a divergence of opinions) or not (as in the case of uniform expectations). Haberler (1936b: 70-71; 1937a: 238-39 ) mentioned in his report the notion devised by "some writers" that "liquidity preferences" tend to rise in a cyclical depression, a concept he would associate to Keynes (1936) in a footnote added to PD (1937a: 238, n.1).
Haberler dismissed it on the grounds that "such generalisations" add very little to the detailed analysis provided in his report, a claim that was not disputed by the other participants.
Fourth Session
The fourth meeting (afternoon of 30 June) dealt with "the most important and difficult problem of the whole theory of the cycle: namely, the upper turning-point" (fourth session, p. 1). Haberler (1936b: 84-90; 1937a: 254-59) suggested that the system becomes more and more sensitive to deflationary disturbing shocks when it approaches full employment. The process of expansion can only go on at the expense of rising prices "and if prices start to rise and rise continuously, I think you will agree that this cannot go on forever -that this rise in prices will become progressive and must be stopped" (p. 41). Haberler's notion of inflation acceleration -that is,
prices "progressing at a more rapid rate" (p. 42; cf. Haberler 1937a: 256) -raised comments from Clark and Hansen, who argued that prices could conceivably rise gradually for a long time.
Haberler was at pains to clarify that "full employment" is a relative, not absolute, concept, since it is not just a matter of the total amount of idle factors, but also of their distribution. "I think
Keynes makes this mistake -he says you can go on expanding so long as there is an unemployed man in the country but if this man happens to be in an industry where demand does not increase during the expansion and if he cannot be moved to another industry, then this will not help" (pp.
43-44). Robbins then asked which rate of unemployment should be described as the "danger point" at which money-wages begin to rise. According to Robbins, one could "find some connection between the percentage of unemployed and the point at which wages rose, although with strong trade unions you might get a rise in wages with 5 per cent unemployment" (p. 45).
Haberler, however, did not show much interest in Robbins's suggestion of a statistical
investigation of (what we now call) a Phillips curve, since "you cannot fix a certain point and say 'Now the danger arises'".
Haberler regarded full employment as a limiting point, in the sense that the expansion could be reversed by maladjustments even before that limit is reached. This led to the "most complicated and most difficult question: namely, that concerning those disturbances or maladjustments which are likely to be brought about by the expansion process itself" (p. 48). It was in this context that Haberler referred to the central question in Part I of his report, as to which changes in the flow of money would restore equilibrium at the end of the boom (see section 3).
However, by the time he drafted Part II, Haberler (1936b: 102-03; cf. 1937a: 268-69) was no longer sure about the existence of a clear-cut answer to that question. "It seems to me the situation is more involved than I thought it was" (p. 49).
After dismissing the "old view" that there is one particular maladjustment that ends the expansion, Haberler maintained that a "very probable" explanation follows from the fact that, as the system approaches full employment and factors of production become scarce, "you still have producers' goods industries on such a high level which is compatible only with a rise in output" (p.50). Eventually the production of capital goods is reduced because consumption goods industries had to contract when full employment was reached. Ohlin objected that the argument is only valid if a constant rate of interest is assumed, so that an expansion of the production of consumption goods through a higher capital/output ratio is ruled out. Haberler was not convinced, since that would "necessitate the assumption of a high flexibility of the system" (p. 63).
Ohlin then suggested another explanation of the turning-point, based on the fact that consumption is a function of both the absolute size of income and of its rates of change. A rise in income could lead to changes in the consumption pattern that eventually produce maladjustments of supply and demand, "so we are bound to get excess supplies somewhere; a fall in prices and small contraction processes which may lead into general contraction processes" (p. 82). Ohlin's remark was followed by a comment by Robertson: "Supposing people are saturated with motor cars and so on for the moment and there is no compensating want in some other direction, then you do get a general decline" (p. 83; cf. Robertson 1934) . At the end of the session Haberler suggested that "it would be useful now to ask ourselves of what kind of statistical and other factual evidence we ought to look if we want to find out in a particular case the reason for the breakdown" (p. 102). However, this question was not followed up in the next meeting.
Fifth Session
The upper turning-point was still the topic at the beginning of the fifth session (morning of 1 July). Haberler noted that several explanations had been considered, but "we have not reached a solution", despite the "great role" of the acceleration principle (fifth session, p.1). Hansen aptly characterized the core of disagreement as relating to "the question whether a large volume of increased saving in the period of expansion [is] deflationary or expansionary in its effect" (p.2).
After some discussion about the possibility that firms' windfall profits and internal savings in the expansion have a deflationary effect that may explain the downturn, the conferees returned to . 19 Another asymmetry is that there is no lower limit in a contraction corresponding to the upper limit of full employment in an upturn (p. 65). Haberler's starting point was that a revival may come about either by an increase in consumers' demand or in producers' spending, which he contrasted with the prevailing view (maintained, e.g., by Schumpeter) that a general upswing could not be brought about by an independent increase in the demand for consumption goods.
One of the main features of a cumulative contraction process is the slowing down of the velocity of circulation of money. Haberler claimed that there is a limit to the accumulation of hoards in terms of money, but even more so in real terms, because prices and wages fall (p. 66; cf.
Haberler 1936b: 119-22; 1937a: 284-87) . When this happens, people will become less disposed to save, and the demand for consumers' goods will cease to fall. "In Mr. Keynes' terminology, the propensity to consume will raise". This is an early formulation of the "Pigou effect", applied to the dynamics of the business cycle (instead of the stationary state, as in Pigou 1943) .
19 Such formulations of the idea that deflationary expectations could generate a liquidity trap were not rare in the pre-Keynesian literature; see Boianovsky (2004) .
After some discussion with Ohlin, Dupriez and Röpke about details of that mechanism (such as its effects on financial markets), Haberler suggested making a compromise: "We shall agree that as long as the process of contraction goes on, hoards are growing...; but it is important to stress this factor which has been much overlooked: that this process involves an increase in the value of hoards. Keynes at many points does not realize this factor and the conclusions which must be drawn from it. Let us make no assumption as to whether there is such a lower limit as I have indicated; it may be of no practical interest" (pp. 69-70). Before the lower limit is reached, the demand for investment may increase because of inventions or re-investment. 20 At the end of the session, Haberler suggested that the next meeting should deal with the question whether a fall in wages and prices can put an end to a contraction (cf. Haberler 1936b: 128-40; 1937a: 291-301) .
Sixth and Seventh Session
The entire sixth meeting (morning 2 July) and part of the seventh meeting (afternoon 2 July) were used to discuss Tinbergen's plans of statistical testing of business cycle theories after the conclusion of Haberler's work at the League. A large part of the discussion consisted of the presentation of the new statistical techniques, which most of the participants were not familiar with (the exceptions being Anderson and Morgenstern). The conversation about Haberler's report was resumed at the middle of the seventh and last session. Haberler pointed out that the opinions about the question posed at the end of the fifth session diverge very much in the literature, and contrasted Keynes's (1936) view -who "says quite frankly that if you reduce money wages, nothing is gained, because prices will fall just as much" -with the view of those "whom he likes to call classical economists", who hold that price and wage flexibility will lead the system out of the depression (seventh session, p. 49). Although the verbatim records make clear that this part of Haberler's report was an attempt to sort out the conflict between Keynes (1936, ch. 19 ) and the "classics", there is no reference to Keynes in the corresponding pages of the first edition of PD.
However, Haberler (1939: 395, n. 2) would make clear in the second edition that his analysis of the effects of a fall in wages "has many points in common with Mr. Keynes' treatment". 20 In reaction to Dupriez, Ohlin redefined the limit of hoarding as "ultimate limit of money destruction" (p. 71). However, the committee did not discuss reductions in the quantity of money due to a credit contraction, caused by increases in repayments and defaults as well as by cutbacks in the loan supply. Such processes are inherent in downward cumulative processes, as noted by Fisher (1933) and others, and may even slow down deflation while intensifying the contractionary process. In how far the contraction ends, when enough "[d]ebts have been cancelled or wiped out by bankruptcy", was discussed by Hansen and Ohlin in the seventh session (pp. 45-48).
Haberler asked how a reduction in money-wages would affect aggregate demand (p. 49).
He made an example of money-wage reductions in a specific industry and concluded that employment in this industry would go up somewhat -with the exception of the case that, "as Keynes says", the wage reductions generate expectations of further reductions. He considered this to be unlikely, but conceded that the increase in employment could be smaller than the fall in price, in which case that the wage reductions would lead to an intensification of the depression.
However, as the industry will save the money -that is, hoard or use it to repay bank loans -
Haberler claimed that the (real balance) effect he had put forward would come into action and bring the system to a higher level of aggregate employment. "If the contraction is intensified, money would fall in value and amount and the system becomes more liquid and sooner or later the point will come when entrepreneurs and people in general will decide that their liquidity has risen enough" (p. 60). The only exception would be an increase in liquidity preference, due to uncertainty. However, "since we do not know exactly the level of liquidity which must be reached in order that the system may go up, it is very difficult to determine that; and if it is found possible to start the expansion in some other way, then certainly it is better to be on the safe side and have wages and prices as flexible as possible" (p. 61; cf. 1936b: 134; 1937a: 297) .
Ohlin disagreed with Haberler's conclusion. "This is the only part where this report does not only fulfill all expectations but even exceeds them as far as practical usefulness goes, in a most satisfying degree..., but may I say that in this chapter on wages there are certain conclusions which might do real harm if they stand unqualified" (pp. 61-62). Ohlin pointed out that the outcome depends on the different timing of the effects on consumption and investment, and that the time lags in the reactions of wage-earners and entrepreneurs tend to differ. Workers will reduce their consumption immediately, whereas entrepreneurs and people who are expecting dividends will count on those being paid only in the next period. Moreover, deflationary price expectations affect investment negatively. Ohlin concluded that nothing definitive could be said about the effects of wage reductions on the volume of production and employment, and his conclusion started a lively discussion. Robbins disagreed with what he called Ohlin's "scepticism" and "intellectual nihilism" (p. 87 and 121). According to Robbins, who received qualified support from Robertson, Röpke and others, wage reductions at the beginning of the depression may contribute to the recovery, especially if there was some wage rigidity at the end of the boom. In the end, Haberler conceded that "everything is possible", but "still I wonder if it is advisable to stress too much that wages should not be reduced" (p. 108). Ohlin pointed out that nobody had suggested that. He had only meant to say that the conditions in which wage reductions help to prevent or mitigate a depression are much too specific to propose them as general solution of the problem. Haberler's remark that "we are now at the end of our discussions" (p. 122) brought the conference of the committee of experts to its end.
V. HABERLER'S SYNTHETIC THEORY OF BUSINESS CYCLES
The meetings of the committee of exports were reported in a brief memorandum, written by John Van Sickle (Rockefeller Foundation) on 25 July 1936. According to Van Sickle (1936: 2) , "a number of those in attendance told me privately that they had come with considerable scepticism as to the usefulness of such a conference. At the end there was not a single one who did not feel that the meeting had been definitely worthwhile. Every one felt that Dr. Haberler had succeeded in bringing about a notable consensus of opinion as to the nature of the phenomenon under examination". The key word was "consensus", since the Rockefeller Foundation expected as one of the results of its five-year grant to the League of Nations, that "the divergence of views among economists as to the nature and the means of controlling the business cycle will be appreciably lessened", which would be an "essential preliminary to the unification of national policies for dealing with the business cycle" ( Van Sickle 1936: 3) .
The meetings of the experts were immediately followed by a conference organized by the Rockefeller Foundation to consider the "Desirability and Feasibility of Encouraging Coordination of Fundamental Economic Research upon Problems of Economic Change", held in Annecy in 3-5 July 1936 (cf. de Marchi 1991: 149-50) . The proceedings (p. 14) of that conference mentioned the "new technique in research which has been followed during the last two years in the study of the theory of Business Cycles by Dr. Haberler", called "Haberler-like methods". It consisted in "consultation with leading authorities in the field.., visits to a number of leading academic centres.., the circulation of drafts dealing with his progress in certain sections of his work.., and a small and carefully selected conference of prominent economists to discuss very fully with him his final draft".
The Impact of the 1936 Conference on 'Prosperity and Depression'
To what extent did the meetings in summer 1936 affect the text of Part II of PD? According to
Haberler's recollections in the preface to the 1958 edition of the book, the criticisms and suggestions made at that conference "led to extensive revisions" of the final draft (Haberler 1964, p. V) . A careful comparison between Haberler (1936b) and Part II of PD (1937a) indicates that, although several revisions were indeed made after the meetings of June/July 1936, they usually did not change the essence of the argument. This may reflect the fact that many aspects of
Haberler's synthesis commanded a considerable degree of agreement. But Haberler's persistence can also be interpreted as a reaction to the difficulties in reaching a consensus whenever there was fundamental controversy, as in the discussions of the upper and lower turning-points of the business cycle described above.
The first chapter of Part II of PD (1937a) , chapter 8 (definition and measurement of the business cycle) did not change, as compared to the version in Haberler (1936b) . Chapter 9-A (on the expansion process) was slightly revised to take into account criticisms by Morgenstern and
Ohlin concerning the intelligibility of the text. The relation between the profit rate and the demand curve for investible funds was clarified (Haberler 1937a: 191-94) . The Robertsonian concept of saving as a decision based on income earned in the previous period was explicitly adopted (1937a: 198) The main difference between Haberler (1936b) and Part II of PD (1937a) was the addition of chapter 11 on "international aspects of business cycles". That chapter was written after the meetings of the committee of experts, where international aspects had not been discussed.
Hence, that chapter was neither circulated nor discussed before its publication, except probably for some feedback from other economists at the Economic Intelligence Service (such as Nurkse and Fleming). This may reflect the fact that, as noticed by Hart (1937: 698) , the topic had not been discussed extensively in the literature prior to PD, and that Haberler's (1937a, ch. 11) analysis therefore grew out of his own work in the field of international trade. In the same vein a review of PD published in The Economist pointed out that Haberler had begun to fill the "most serious gap in our knowledge of the trade cycle", that is, "its international aspects". 21 Among other things, chapter 11 of PD dealt with the question how the choice of the exchange-rate system and the degree of international capital mobility affect the international transmission of economic fluctuations. With an eye to the coordination of national macroeconomic stabilization policies, those topics were of central concern to the League of Nations and the Rockefeller Foundation.
Reviews of 'Prosperity and Depression'
Haberler's Theoretical Analysis of Cyclical Movements (the subtitle of PD, 1937a) was reviewed in the main economic journals (see Officer 1982: 152-53) , with largely positive reactions to its synthetic approach, presented in Part II. Many of the reviews stressed that he had succeeded in 21 See Flanders (1989: 275-81 ) for Haberler's (1937a) treatment of the international propagation of business cycles in a general equilibrium setting that involves both current and capital accounts.
increasing the area of consensus concerning the nature of economic fluctuations. Ellsworth (1938: 108) suggested that Haberler's explanation of the business cycle is "the most complete and coherent yet available". As pointed out by Ellsworth (110), Haberler makes it clear that the "desire for liquidity" is a function not only of the rate of interest but also of the price level, which explains its satiation with falling prices. In a brief note, Harrod (1938) remarked that the synthetic view in Part II of PD was built on the common ground discovered in Part I, but that Haberler also revealed "irreconcilable points of divergence, in the hope that they may ultimately be settled by the test of experience". Hart (1937: 697) admired the balance in the survey in Part I of the book, relating it to Haberler's ability "to be almost completely free from the contemporary curse of being unable to understand what other people are saying". Hart's review focused on chapters 9
and 10, the two central chapters of the book, whose arrangement he found "novel and very suggestive". He complained nevertheless that there was no detailed analysis of what sort of adjustments could prevent the breakdown. A similar comment was made by Kahn (1937) , who wrote the longest and most critical review of PD, as discussed below.
While Kahn (1937) Kahn was also critical of Haberler's analysis of the effect of a reduction of money-wages on employment, which stressed dishoarding instead of the Keynesian route of a fall in the rate of interest. Kahn's (1937: 677-78 ) main criticism was provoked by Haberler's ambiguous answer (1937a: 268-69) to the central question in PD, namely: whether the crisis could be staved off by an increase or by a decrease in saving. As documented above, Haberler admitted at the expert meetings that he had come to the conclusion that the question was more complex than he thought when he had originally formulated it in Part I. Kahn drew attention to a similar ambiguity in
Haberler's discussion of public works, reflecting "a major defect in this book, from the point of view of those who seek advice on matters of practical policy" (Kahn 1937: 678) .
22
Despite his being "unsympathetic to the author's basic ideology", Kahn (1937: 673-77) admitted that there were some positive points in PD. Haberler's (1937a: 215) Harrod's (1936) book on the trade cycle. 22 Haberler's somewhat surprising answer to the question whether his diagnosis of the breakdown should be classified as under-saving or over-saving (1937a: 265-70) was, as noted by Kahn, that both types of maladjustments could be associated with his analysis of the upper turning-point. The depression could only be avoided by a shift in the structure of production, but the outcome depended upon in which industries technical adaptation is more easily achieved. An increase in saving will help to reestablish equilibrium only if technical progress is realized in producers' goods industries. Interestingly Ellis, who first agreed with Kahn about Haberler's "inconclusiveness" (Ellis 1938:119) , would later describe Haberler's suggestion that "it all depends" as a "noteworthy original contribution" (Ellis 1941: 291) . In his reply to Kahn, Haberler (1938) did not touch upon this issue, but focused on the "terminological gulf" between his system and the Keynesian one.
Harrod's Trade Cycle (1936) appeared when PD was already in the press (cf. Haberler 1937a: 217 n. 1). Haberler reviewed it for the Journal of Political Economy (1937), where he described Harrod's approach as "eclectic", adding that "this is by no means intended to be a criticism; it seems to me, on the contrary, to be the only possible procedure" (1937b: 690). He criticized Harrod nevertheless for ignoring that the interaction of the "Relation" (Harrod's name for the acceleration principle) and the "Multiplier" was not a new concept, but a description of the Wicksellian process of contraction, a common feature of almost all business cycle theories (cf.
1937a: 243 n. 1). Harrod's ignorance concealed the continuity of thought and created the "impression of deep-rooted dissensions between different groups of writers which is so discrediting for the reputation of economists" (Haberler 1937b: 691 Hicks's (1950) model of the business cycle.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an obituary note on Haberler Paul Samuelson, who was his student at Harvard in the mid1930s, recalled a conversation with him. "Gottfried, your trouble is that you are so damnably eclectic" (1996: 1680, italics in the original). Haberler replied: "Paul, how do you know mother nature is not eclectic?" Although the danger of eclecticism was not a big issue for Haberler, he was at pains to differentiate an open-minded from the purely eclectic attitude that he defined in his obituary article on Schumpeter as the attempt to "reconcile the irreconcilable, or merely to assemble unconnected and uncoordinated theorems and facts" (Haberler [1950 (Haberler [ ] 1964 . From this perspective, PD was not a book where all rival explanations of the business cycle would find a room, but primarily an expression of the League's quest for a consensus that would allow the formulation of a testable synthesis. The notion of consensus as a key concept in scientific progress can be found in the pragmatic theory of truth put forward by the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce (b. 1839; d. 1914) . According to Peirce, propositions are true just because they are universally accepted. Investigators would move towards a common conclusion because evidence takes the form of perceptions that are controlled by a single objective reality that is public to all. In this sense, a proposition is true if it accurately reflects the reality. However, according to Peirce, reality is just a construct of the community of investigators, that is, "the real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down" (Peirce 1931-58, vol. 6: 610 ; see also Kirkham 1998 for a critical account of Peirce's theory of truth). In the same vein, Thomas Kuhn (1970: ch. 12 ) stressed that the ability to reach a consensus differentiates scientific from other communities. In Kuhnian terms, the situation of business cycle research in the early 1930s could be described as pre-paradigmatic.
The League's business cycle project in the 1930s was based on the belief that it would be possible to separate the terminological differences from the substantive ones, and thus generate Haberler's efforts to convey a balanced view of the literature.
What was driving the League's quest for consensus in business cycle theory in the 1930s?
As discussed by de Marchi (1991: 143-45) and Clavin (2003: 231-39 As documented above, reaching an agreement about the causes of economic fluctuations was perceived by both the League's and the Rockefeller Foundation's officers as necessary to the coordination of national policies to stabilize the business cycle. The intrinsic weakness of macroeconomic theory at the time, as shown by the proliferation of competing theories, helps to explain the search for a consensus that could protect and give credibility to the League's effort to regain its role as a player in the world economy. Haberler (1937a) was not the first attempt to build a synthetic approach to the business cycle based on a careful discussion of different theories. Hansen (1927, ch. 8 ) and especially Mitchell (1913: 19-20; 1927: 47-60; ) had adopted partly similar strategies of investigation .
In a letter to Haberler Mitchell (5 March 1936) actually reacted positively to Haberler's (1936c) article, which summarized central elements of PD:
"My liking is perhaps pre-determined by the fact that you take much the same ground on various basic points that I took in my book of 1913. Thus we both see the task of business cycle theory as explaining the four phases of the business cycle that you mention; we both treat the fear of eclecticism in combining hypotheses as superstition… You go on, of course, to make analytical use of the later theories concerning cyclical turns of which I have not yet had occasion to consider analytically."
However, while Mitchell stressed the difficulty of using deductive arguments to choose among multiple hypotheses, Haberler focused on the discussion of the logical structure of the competing theories. According to Mitchell (1913: 19) "there is slight hope of getting answers" to questions about choice among multiple hypotheses "by a logical process of proving and criticizing the theories. For whatever merits of ingenuity and consistency they may possess, these theories have slight value except as they give keener insight into the phenomena of business cycles. It is by study of facts which they purport to interpret that the theories must be tested". Hence, the use of a survey of theories is to "reveal certain facts" to be investigated statistically. Mitchell (1927: 59) claimed that this is the correct order of argument, instead of a "treatment which begins with a 'theory' and then looks for 'facts'". In contrast, Haberler's (1937a) approach was based on the idea that the construction of the theoretical set-up should precede the statistical work, in the sense that the relations between variables are postulates and not results (cf. Schumpeter 1954 (cf. Schumpeter : 1163 .
Reaching a consensus on the relevant theoretical issues was only the first stage of the League's project. The researchers at the Economic Intelligence Service were aware that "there are many points where no definite solution can be proposed, but where the existence of a number of possibilities will be indicated. The choice between these can then be made only on the basis of empirical investigations" (Haberler 1937a: 2) . 23 The task of statistical testing of the synthesis put forward in Part II of PD would be faced by Tinbergen (1939) , who started to work for the League in autumn 1936, when Haberler had left for Harvard. 23 Haberler's approach to methodology was heavily influenced by the philosopher Felix Kaufmann (b. 1895; d. 1949 ) who, like Haberler, was a member of Mises's famous private seminar in Vienna in the 1920s. Kaufmann stressed the distinction between "tautological" and "empirical" statements, adopted by Haberler (cf. Kaufmann 1936; Boianovsky 2000: 158-59 he criticized the latter for supporting public works as the best policy in the depression. According to Haberler, Harrod's prescription was based on a diagnosis that allows for only one type of maladjustment and overlooks the fact that "the process of contraction may be in the main features always the same, but the cause by which it is initiated need not be and probably is not always the same. Therefore the policy... can hardly be invariably identical". This conclusion, based on
Haberler's (1937) synthetic view, was just too sophisticated to gain common consent from economists and policy makers in general.
